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NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAMS: HOW DO WE
BEST PROTECT PRIVACY RIGHTS WHILE
ENSURING OPTIMAL NEWBORN HEALTH?
INTRODUCTION
Each year an estimated four million infants are born in the United
States and tested for metabolic and genetic abnormalities in newborn
screening programs.' Newborn screening programs are conducted in
every state by standard procedures in which health professionals ob-
tain blood samples via a heel prick from each newborn, test the sam-
ples for various metabolic and genetic disorders, and in some cases,
use the samples for research.2
This standard blood draw taken within the first forty-eight hours of
life may be described to parents as nothing more than a sample to run
tests to make sure everything is "okay." Of course, parents want to
make sure everything is "okay," but what does this really mean, and
what do these tests really do? For many parents, the birth of a child is
a rewarding and exciting time accompanied by a healthy dose of anxi-
ety and fear of the unknown world of parenthood. In the immediate
aftermath of a child's birth, newly minted parents may be physically
and mentally exhausted and may not be best equipped to make deci-
sions regarding their own or their newborn's legal rights, as their pri-
mary concern is to leave the hospital with a healthy newborn child.
As a personal experience, it was only when I initiated a discussion
regarding newborn screening programs with my health care provider
that we addressed the existence of these programs. Unexpectedly, I
was much more educated than my health care provider about my
state's newborn screening policies even after only a brief reading of
the law and the refusal rights of parents.
To adequately ensure the privacy rights of newborn citizens and
their parents, states should be required to obtain informed consent for
newborn screening from every parent that enters into the state medi-
cal system for prenatal care.3 The operation of programs that screen
newborns for medical and genetic disorders must, at the least, be done
1. See Beth A. Tarini, The Current Revolution in Newborn Screening: New Technology, Old
Controversies, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENCE MED. 767, 767 (2007).
2. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Screening and Treatment of Newborns, 29 Hous. L. REV. 85, 95
(1992).
3. See Nanette Elster, Future Uses of Residual Newborn Blood Spots: Legal and Ethical Con-
siderations, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 179, 180-82 (2005).
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with parents' full knowledge of the program; any other system should
be unacceptable to all parents, legal guardians, and citizens of the
United States.
A majority of the states conduct opt-out newborn screening pro-
grams;4 only two jurisdictions, Wyoming and the District of Columbia,
administer opt-in newborn screening programs requiring informed
consent.5 While both types of programs can responsibly maintain the
parents' ultimate control of their newborn's privacy rights, the
mandatory data collection under opt-out programs and potential use
of newborn samples in later research implicate a myriad of legal and
ethical issues, 6 particularly for programs with no requirements for any
parental education regarding the screening program. The legal and
ethical challenges of newborn screening programs resemble those en-
countered by adult genetic screening, prenatal screening, diagnostic
screening,7 and tissue sample collection;" namely, issues related to in-
formed consent, the right to privacy, test result confidentiality, genetic
or medical discrimination, and federalism (due to the lack of a nation-
4. See Sandra J. Carnahan, Biobanking Newborn Bloodspots for Genetic Research Without
Consent, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & PoLY 299, 301-05 (2011); see also Newborn Genetic and
Metabolic Disease Screening, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Issues-
Research/Health/NewbornGeneticandMetabolicScreeningLaws/tabid/14416/Default.aspx (last
visited Nov. 15, 2011).
5. See Bradford L. Therrell et al., Status of Newborn Screening Programs in the United States,
117 PEDIATRICS S212, S226-28 (Supp. 2006); see also D.C. CODE § 7-834 (2001); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 35-4-801 (2011).
6. See Mary Ann Baily et al., Exploring Options for Expanded Newborn Screening, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS, no. 4, 2005, at 46, 46 ("To be ethical, decision-making for newborn genetic
screening must be evidence-based, take the opportunity cost of the newborn screening (NBS)
program into account, distribute the costs and benefits of the program fairly, and appropriately
respect human rights. . . . Policy decisions raise difficult ethical issues relating to consent to
screening, confidentiality, and the use of blood samples for research and quality improvement.
The current policy process is not structured to meet [these] ethical requirements.").
7. Most states' newborn screening programs effectively mandate genetic testing, whereas fed-
eral law and most states' laws require informed consent for adult genetic testing. See Elizabeth
A. Ackmann, Note, Prenatal Testing Gone Awry: The Birth of a Conflict of Ethics and Liability,
2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 199, 220-21 (2005); Francy E. Foral, Note, Necessity's Sharp Pinch:
Parental and States' Rights in Conflict in an Era of Newborn Genetic Screening, 2 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 109, 118 (2006); see also Edward J. Janger, Genetic Information, Privacy and
Insolvency, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 79, 84 (2005); Michael J. Malinowski, Coming into Being:
Law, Ethics, and the Practice of Prenatal Genetic Screening, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1437 (1994);
Wendy E. Roop, Note, Not in My Womb: Compelled Prenatal Genetic Testing, 27 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.O. 397, 413 (2000).
8. See Baily et al., supra note 6, at 46 ("Newborn screening programs must also respect Amer-
ican beliefs about the rights of individuals to make decisions about medical treatment, research
participation, and the use of their personal information and body tissues such as blood
samples.").
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wide standard). 9 The central focus of the legal issues implicated by
newborn screening programs should always be the interests of the
child and parents because screening "principally and substantially af-
fects them."' 0 Although most newborn screening programs have gone
unchallenged, the lack of required education in the face of mandatory
newborn screening programs has created a situation of parental-and
even health professional-unawareness of both the test itself and the
opportunities available to parents to refuse sample testing, to refuse
research use, to set the duration of sample storage, and to opt for
availability of accelerated sample destruction."
In addition, the fact that collection of genetic information for adults
in almost all states is a consent-based program' 2 raises questions of
why newborn citizens may be exploited in a way that we do not allow
ourselves to be. What are the interests overriding the rights of these
children? Is it the commitment to public health interests to ensure the
safety and welfare of newborns? Is it the potential research value of
the biological samples obtained? Is it the ignorance of the general
public to the programs as a whole? Undeniably, there is a strong pub-
lic health interest in assuring that every newborn in the United States
obtains adequate and efficient medical care. However, it seems likely
that lack of education about the programs is a more likely reason for
not requiring the same level of consent as adult testing. This seems
particularly true in light of the fact that many states still do not require
parental education, and even in those that do, the implementation of
this education is many times not fully realized.
The scientific advancement of technologies and scientific awareness
of disease and genetic disorders has pushed the issue of newborn
screening to the forefront. In 2008, Congress passed the Newborn
Screening Saves Lives Act of 2007 to provide some uniformity and
direction for the states to follow. 13 A national response coordinated
by Citizens' Council on Health Care analyzed the scientific literature
9. See Jon F. Merz, Psychosocial Risks of Storing and Using Human Tissues in Research, 8
RISK 235, 236-37 (1997); see also Baily et al., supra note 6, at 46; Foral, supra note 7, at 118.
10. Foral, supra note 7, at 116.
11. See Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S226-28.
12. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2010) ("Except as provided elsewhere in this policy, no investiga-
tor may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by this policy unless the investi-
gator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally
authorized representative." (emphasis added)).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 300b-8 (2006 & Supp. 2010); see also Pub. L. No. 110-204, 122 Stat. 705 (2008)
(describing its purpose of "amendfing] the Public Health Service Act to establish grant programs
to provide for education and outreach on newborn screening and coordinated followup care
once newborn screening has been conducted, to reauthorize programs under part A of title XI of
such Act, and for other purposes").
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on the effectiveness of newborn screening, delineated the best evi-
dence for screening specific medical conditions, and recommended a
more uniform condition panel of diseases to be followed by all
states.14 However, the states still govern the specific collection, reten-
tion, and testing laws for their newborn screening programs, and sig-
nificant variations exist. For example, some states retain collected
blood samples anywhere from a few weeks or months, while others
hold samples indefinitely.15 In addition, states differ as to the require-
ment for parental education prior to receiving the parents' dissent
(opt-out) or consent (opt-in). 16
The newborn screening programs of Texas and Minnesota were
brought into the legal limelight after parents challenged the programs'
constitutionality, 17 and national efforts are currently underway to pro-
vide uniformity to the state newborn screening programs.18 There-
fore, it is important to focus on the variations between state programs
and to determine which state programs best address the current legal
and social concerns. The opt-in programs, while in the severe minor-
ity, are better structured to protect privacy rights and guarantee pa-
rental education regarding awareness of the testing, as well as the
diseases and conditions screened during testing. Opt-in newborn
screening programs are more beneficial than opt-out programs on nu-
merous levels.
First, consent-based programs respect the parents' and patients'
right of privacy and their choice in their medical treatment and care. 19
Second, adopting a consent-based program requires physicians to en-
gage with their patients to educate them about the options available to
their child.20 Third, consent-based programs, through incorporation
of education and express parental consent for various research uses,
14. See generally TWILA BRASE, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR GENETIC
PRIVACY AND CONSENT RIGHTS IN CONGRESS' PROPOSED 'NEWBORN SCREENING SAVES LIVES
Acr OF 2007' (2008).
15. See Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S223-25 (showing Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri,
and Oklahoma with the shortest retention period of one month; Indiana, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island with the longest specified retention period of twenty-three years; and California, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina,
and Vermont retaining samples "indefinitely").
16. See id. at S226-28 (showing no parental education required in Alabama, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Florida, Georgia, South Dakota, and others, as opposed to Alaska, Arizona, California,
the District of Columbia, Maryland, and others requiring parental education before screening).
17. See Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); First Amended Complaint,
Beleno v. Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs., No. 5:09-cv-00188-FB (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2009)
[hereinafter Beleno Complaint].
18. See generally BRASE, supra note 14.
19. See Foral, supra note 7, at 120.
20. See id.
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may provide greater research use of samples than is currently
available. 21
On the other hand, mandatory opt-out programs ensure that every
newborn is tested for disorders that are known to benefit from early
detection and treatment, and that the state is fulfilling its public health
role in screening newborns and evaluating data about the health and
well-being of both individuals and the state's newborn population as a
whole.22 However, any concern of diminished participation in opt-in
programs may be ill founded, as a recent study has shown that opt-in
programs generate equivalent participation when compared to opt-out
programs.23
Why then are forty-eight jurisdictions administering opt-out new-
born screening programs, 24 some with opt-out conditions strictly lim-
ited to religious beliefs? Are the hesitancies surrounding a shift to
opt-in programs justified? Is the basis of bettering the public health
through research access to newborn blood specimens sufficient when
measured against the barrier to parental and infant rights? Are the
states justified in lowering the privacy rights in infant genetic samples,
as compared to adult genetic samples, which require express consent?
To address these questions, Part II of this Comment provides a pro-
file of the current newborn screening programs, specifically identify-
ing the general panel of diseases tested, the role of parental consent,
and the requirement of parental education prior to specimen collec-
tion.25 This profile focuses on comparing the two jurisdictions with
21. See id. at 124.
22. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Assessing the New Criteria for Newborn Screening, 19 HEALTH MA-
TRIX 163, 164 (2009) ("The original justification for this approach was that the benefits of screen-
ing are so dramatic for conditions like PKU that the state is within its parens patria authority to
mandate screening for newborns."); see also Foral, supra note 7, at 118 ("The principal justifica-
tion offered for mandatory screening is the claim that society's obligation to promote child wel-
fare through early detection and treatment of selected conditions supersedes parental
prerogatives to refuse any minor medical intervention.").
23. See Beth A. Tarini et al., Not Without My Permission: Parents' Willingness to Permit Use of
Newborn Screening Samples for Research, 13 PuB. HEALTH GENOMICS 125, 125, 127 (2010)
(describing an Internet-based survey analyzing 1,508 parent respondents over the age of eigh-
teen). Tarini found that if permission was obtained, 76.2% of parents were "very or somewhat
willing" to permit use of newborn samples for research, whereas only 28.2% of parents were
"very or somewhat willing" to permit use of samples for research if permission was not obtained.
Id. at 125.
24. Nebraska is not included as an opt-out state due to the fact it is the only state that has a
strictly mandatory newborn screening program with no statutory exceptions allowed, even for
religious beliefs. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-519 to -524 (2008); Therrell et al., supra note 5, at
S226-28.
25. See infra notes 28-157 and accompanying text. The various aspects of current U.S. new-
born screening programs (for example, the requirement of consent, sample storage duration,
permissibility of research uses, and panel of diseases screened) are compared to a comprehen-
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opt-in programs to a subset of those that have enacted mandatory opt-
out programs. Part III of this Comment analyzes the newborn screen-
ing program profile in light of two recent legal battles in which state
newborn screening programs were challenged as implementing uncon-
stitutional searches and seizures. 26 In light of these controversies, this
Comment proposes the components of a model statute and guidelines
that avoid the legal concerns raised by these cases. The model statu-
tory components emphasize (1) parental consent and education to en-
sure privacy rights; (2) the creation of a tiered system for the panel of
diseases screened, varying in their requirements for parental consent,
to ensure screening is limited to medically meaningful testing; and (3)
the regulation of storage and research uses for samples collected to
ensure privacy rights. Lastly, Part IV of this Comment discusses the
impact a widespread adoption of opt-in programs would have on the
landscape of the current newborn screening programs.27
II. BACKGROUND
To provide an appreciation of the variations within newborn screen-
ing programs, this Part begins with a brief history of newborn screen-
ing programs in the United States, followed by a discussion of specific
state statutes and some recent case law challenging those statutes. It
additionally explores the historical and current debates in the legisla-
tive and media arenas to highlight the basis for implementing opt-in or
opt-out newborn screening programs. In particular, this Part focuses
on the two opt-in jurisdictions of Wyoming and the District of Colum-
bia and three opt-out jurisdictions; namely Texas, Minnesota, and Ma-
ryland-a recent convert.
A. History of Newborn Screening Programs
Newborn screening programs are state-run programs that involve
testing biological samples (most commonly blood collected within the
first forty-eight hours post-birth) for abnormalities in levels of en-
zymes, metabolites, and other chemicals. 28 In addition, newborn
sive report detailing the U.S. newborn screening programs for at least forty-five of the fifty-one
programs as of 2006. See Therrell et al., supra note 5.
26. See infra notes 158-89 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
28. See Louis J. ELSAS, II, Newborn Screening, in RUDOLPH'S PEDIATRICS § 10.1.3, at 281
(Abraham M. Rudolph et al. eds., 19th ed. 1991).
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screening detects the presence of specific genetic sequences that cor-
relate with the presence or onset of particular diseases.29
The original purpose of newborn screening programs was twofold.
First, the programs created a comprehensive early checkpoint for the
American health care system to adequately monitor the health of the
infant population via the relatively easy access to a vast majority of
newborns. 30 Second, the programs were intended to detect metabolic
abnormalities known to have severe consequences, including death,
that were discoverable by a simple blood test and easily treated during
postnatal infancy.31
Mandated newborn screening newborn programs were initiated in
Massachusetts in 1963 due to advances in testing methods for
phenylketonuria (PKU), a rare genetic disorder that can cause mental
retardation but is treatable by diet modifications if detected early.32
By 1975, many states had followed Massachusetts's lead, resulting in
ninety percent of all newborns in the United States being tested for
PKU.3 3 Currently, all states and the District of Columbia have imple-
29. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Ten Fingers, Ten Toes: Newborn Screening for Untreatable Dis-
orders, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 199, 201 (2009) (discussing the implications of genetic testing for
untreatable disorders in newborn screening programs as aiding in "avoiding delays in diagnosis
often after numerous consultations, providing parents with information about their children's
health, allowing the earlier initiation of interventions, learning more about the natural history of
these disorders, providing reproductive information to the family, and creating more opportuni-
ties to support these families"); see also Lauren E. Fisher, The Use of Tandem Mass Spectrometry
in Newborn Screening: Australia's Experience and Its Implications for United States Policy, 15
PAC. Rim L. & PoL'Y J. 137, 137 (2006) ("Newborn screening is the most common type of ge-
netic testing practiced in the United States today.").
30. Clayton, supra note 2, at 95.
31. See id. at 96 & n.48; Elster, supra note 3, at 180 (discussing the development of newborn
screening programs in the 1960s testing for phenylketonuria (PKU) and the mandatory PKU
screening of newborns that followed, resulting in "the first population-based genetic screening
program in the United States").
32. Diane B. Paul, The History of Newborn Phenylketonuria Screening in the U.S., in FINAL
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING app. 5 (Neil A. Holtzman & Michael S.
Watson eds., 1997), available at http://biotech.law.1su.edu/research/fed/tfgt/appendix5.htm ("This
history of broad-based PKU screening began in 1963, when, following the invention of a vastly
improved test to detect PKU in infants, Massachusetts became the first state to mandate screen-
ing-that is, to make screening of all newborns compulsory by law. The National Association
for Retarded Children (NARC), an organization representing parents of retarded children and
professionals in the field, advocated the screening and found that its application was very une-
ven. For example, in 1964, in Massachusetts maternity hospitals, virtually all infants were
screened, but in thirty-two other states, fewer than half of the hospitals had instituted screening
programs. The NARC proposed a model law, and, with officials of the Children's Bureau of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and of state departments of public health, pro-
moted mandatory screening."); see also Botkin, supra note 22, at 163 (discussing PKU and new-
born screening).
33. Paul, supra note 32.
876 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:869
mented newborn screening programs for various metabolic and ge-
netic disorders, including PKU and congenital hypothyroidism. 34
B. Recent Expansion of the Diseases Tested in
Newborn Screening Programs
As a result of the increasing relevance of biological and genetic in-
formation and the advancements in disease testing methodologies, 35
states have expanded screening in their newborn testing programs.
Many disease panels include not only those diseases known to benefit
from intervention at infancy (such as PKU), but also diseases for
which there is no known intervention or treatment available and dis-
eases for which a prediction of diagnosis is given based on genetics. 3 6
This has resulted in many organizations coming forward in the last few
decades to make recommendations for implementation of more uni-
form and successful programs. These recommendations have focused
on the types of diseases and abnormalities included in the screening
(treatable, nontreatable, or predictive), the level of consent required,
and the parental education required.37 In 2006, the American Acad-
emy of Family Physicians (AAFP) published an issue brief stating that
local AAFP chapters should recommend (1) "that their states give
34. Id.; see also National Newborn Screening Status Report, NAT'L NEWBORN SCREENING &
GENETIcs RESOURCE CENTER, http://genes-r-us.uthscsa.edu/nbsdisorders.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
2012).
35. Tandem mass spectroscopy (TMS) has become the principal tool for analysis of newborn
screening samples. See generally Am. Coll. Med. Genetics/Am. Soc'y Human Genetics Test &
Tech. Transfer Comm. Working Grp. (ACMG/ASHG), Tandem Mass Spectrometry in Newborn
Screening, 2 GENETICS MED. 267 (2000) (noting that the mass spectrometer determines the types
of molecules present in a sample and the quantity of those molecules present, such as amino
acids and acylcarnitines-both critical components to disease detection as they can accumulate
in the blood when a child has a metabolic disorder); see also Sam Crowe, A Brief History of
Newborn Screening in the United States (Mar. 2008) (President's Council for Bioethics Staff
Discussion Paper), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/background/new-
bornscreening-crowe.html ("Tandem mass spectrometry is the most reliable, widely available
method for measuring these compounds in a child's blood." (citing ACMG/ASHG, supra, at
267-69)).
36. See Tarini, supra note 1, at 768 ("While recognizing the potential value of new technology
for newborn screening, Botkin and colleagues worry about the adverse consequences of rapidly
expanding newborn screening without establishing the appropriate research and resource infra-
structure needed to provide high-quality medical services to children and their families." (foot-
note omitted)); see also Baily et al., supra note 6, at 47 ("In developing criteria for selection of
disorders, consideration of the prevention potential and medical rationale is needed. This ap-
proach required weighing several factors including: identifying a condition that provides a clear
benefit to the newborn while preventing a delay in diagnosis and prevention of a developmental
impairment or preventing illness or death.").
37. See, e.g., AM. ACAD. FAMILY PHYSICIANS, ISSUE BRIEF: NEWBORN SCREENING 2 (2006),
available at http://www.aafp.org/online/etc/medialib/aafp-org/documents/policy/state/newborn.
Par.0001.File.tmp/stateadv-newbornscreening.pdf [hereinafter AAFP ISSUE BRIEF].
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consideration to mandatory newborn screening for those [diseases] for
which the evidence is most rigorously supportive"; (2) "that families
be appropriately informed for consent"; and (3) that family physicians
and office staff be "prepare[d] to educate families concerning new-
born screening, and to respond to questions from families concerning
positive tests."38
Many professional medical organizations do not fully support pre-
dictive genetic testing to reveal propensity for diseases with no ex-
isting treatment or for which there is a belated onset of the disease
(post-childhood). 39 A more evidence-based approach to constructing
a disease panel would require sufficient data that correlates knowl-
edge of the disease with the benefit to the child, the latter of which
"must remain a central criterion" for newborn screening programs. 40
Generally, a set of five classic criteria, established by Wilson and
Junger in 1968, has been influential in defining a disorder or disease
suited for inclusion in the newborn screening panel:
(1) the disease must be well-defined and serious ... ; (2) there must
be an accurate testing method available; (3) the costs of the test
must be reasonable; (4) there must be available treatment for the
38. Id.; see also Parent and Family Resources, NAT'L NEWBORN SCREENING & GENETICS RE-
SOURCE CENTER, http://genes-r-us.uthscsa.edu/parentpage.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (advis-
ing that full comprehensive screening should include parental education, testing, diagnosis,
follow-up, and treatment plans).
AAFP considers "appropriate" information to address both benefits and potential harms of
reporting diseases that are detected in the "Tandem Mass Spectrometry panel." AAFP ISSUE
BRIEF, supra note 37. The Tandem Mass Spectrometry panel includes screening for various dis-
eases, some of which result in the infant being "diagnosed" with propensity for disease onset at
later stages of life. See, e.g., ACMG/ASHG, supra note 35, at 268 ("The issue of informed con-
sent for MS/MS screening is complicated, in part because uniformly effective therapies have not
been developed for all the conditions the methodology can detect and because it may detect
previously unrecognized metabolites and or disorders.").
39. Beth A. Tarini et al., Parents' Interest in Predictive Genetic Testing for Their Children when
a Disease Has No Treatment, 124 PEDIATRICS e432, e435 (2009) (citing Comm. on Bioethics,
Ethical Issues with Genetic Testing in Pediatrics, 107 PEDIATRICS 1451 (2001); ASHG/ACMG,
Points to Consider: Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial Implications of Genetic Testing in Children
and Adolescents, 57 AM. J. Hum. GENETICS 1233 (1995)).
40. Botkin, supra note 22, at 183-84; see also AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2006 ANNUAL
MEETING: COUNCIL ON SCI. & PUB. HEALTH, STANDARDIZATION OF NEWBORN SCREENING
PROGRAMS 9 (2006), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/csaphla06csaph9-full
text.pdf [hereinafter AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES REPORT] ("In spite of the fact that newborn
screening programs have been in place for more than 40 years in this country, much of the
evidence demonstrating screening program effectiveness is based on expert opinion rather than
randomized controlled trials. In addition, there is a lack of formal evidence demonstrating
clinical differences in outcomes that can be attributed to therapies initiated as a consequence of
pre-symptomatic testing. While preliminary results indicate that children identified by screening
have fewer developmental and health problems than children identified clinically, an urgent
need remains for long-term tracking of data to enhance understanding of health outcomes,
clinical course of disease, and effective treatments." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
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disorder; and (5) there must be adequate medical management fa-
cilities to refer infants for confirmatory diagnosis and treatment.41
In an effort to identify information to aid in the creation of a more
uniform disease screening panel among the states, the Maternal and
Child Health Bureau sponsored a study conducted by the American
College of Medical Genetics.42 A group of medical and research ex-
perts developed principles and criteria for determining which condi-
tions should be evaluated, resulting in three main categories: (1)
"clinical characteristics"; (2) "analytical characteristics of the screen-
ing test"; and (3) "diagnosis, treatment and management of the condi-
tion in both acute and chronic forms." 43 After evaluating each
condition relative to the above categories, the experts applied an evi-
dence-based review that looked at the conditions currently tested in
state newborn screening programs. They reconsidered each condi-
tion's inclusion in newborn screening panels based on the scientific
evidence as to "the availability of a screening test; [a]n efficacious
treatment; [a]n adequate understanding of the natural history;
[w]hether the condition was part of the differential diagnosis of an-
other condition; and [w]hether the screening test results related to a
clinically significant condition." 44
The conditions were classified into three categories: a core panel
(primary targets), secondary targets, and those not appropriate for
newborn screening. 45 According to the study, in order to be included
as a primary target, a condition must (1) "be identifi[able] at a phase
. . . at which it would not ordinarily be detected"; (2) have "[a] test
with appropriate sensitivity and specificity . . . available for it"; and (3)
have "demonstrated benefits of early detection, timely intervention
41. Eileen M. McKenna, The Mandatory Testing of Newborns for HIV: Too Much, Too Little,
Too Late, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTS. 307, 327-28 (1997) (citing John M. Naber & David R.
Johnson, Mandatory HIV Testing Issues in State Newborn Screening Program, 7 J.L. & HEALTH
55, 57 (1992-1993)). In 1968, J.M.G. Wilson and G. Jungner issued a classic publication regard-
ing criteria for population screening; their ideas remain "influential in the context of newborn
screening." See Botkin, supra note 22, at 165 (citing J. M. G. WILSON & G. JUNoNER, PRINCI-
PLES AND PRACTICE OF SCREENING FOR DISEASE (1968), available at http://www.who.int/bulle-
tin/volumes/86/4/07-050112bp.pdf). There have been revisions to address "quality assurance,
equity, access, and scientific evidence of effectiveness. Nevertheless, the core principles remain
closely aligned over the decades." Id.
42. MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NEWBORN SCREENING: TOWARD A UNIFORM SCREENING PANEL AND SYSTEM, available at
http://www.hrsa.gov/advisorycommittees/mchbadvisory/heritabledisorders/uniformscreening.pdf
[hereinafter MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH BUREAU REPORT]; see also Botkin, supra note 22.,
at 169-70.
43. MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH BUREAU REPORT, supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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and efficacious treatment." 46 The experts determined that of the con-
ditions being screened in 2004, approximately one-third of them
would be considered in the core panel and another third of them
would be considered not appropriate to include.47
C. The Current Newborn Screening Program Landscape
Currently, states vary in the diseases included in their newborn
screening panels, 48 though some states have formed regional groups to
establish guidelines for their newborn screening programs in an effort
to minimize the variation and provide more uniform services in larger
regions. 49 Despite these efforts, there is still a need for greater uni-
formity among the states not only for the panel of diseases screened,
but also for other critical aspects of the programs, such as consent and
education.
Since the introduction of state newborn screening programs, some
states, such as Texas and Minnesota, have either made or proposed
changes to their newborn screening programs, motivated in part by
the legal challenges encountered and the media attention received.50
Dr. Bradford Therrell of the National Newborn Screening and Genet-
ics Resource Center, along with others, reported a comprehensive
summary of the newborn screening programs in all fifty-one U.S. pro-
grams.5' The article notes:
Although all 51 programs (all states and the District of Columbia)
have statutory screening requirements and similarities exist in many
parts of the different screening systems, the enabling statutes, rules,
regulations, protocols, and financing strategies vary dramatically.
46. Id.
47. Id. The resulting core panel included 29 conditions considered appropriate for newborn
screening. Id. The study identified another 25 conditions identified in the secondary panel. Id.
Lastly, there were 27 conditions that were not considered appropriate for newborn screening,
either because they met too few evaluation criteria or lacked a screening test. Id.
48. See Tarini, supra note 1, at 768 ("The number of disorders screened across states ranged
from 0 to 8 disorders in 1995 and from 7 to 52 in 2005." (footnote omitted)).
49. See, e.g., Who We Are, NEW ENG. NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM, http://www.umass
med.edu/nbs/who/index.aspx?linkidentifier=id&itemid=65346 (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) ("The
New England Newborn Screening Program is a comprehensive public health screening program
for newborns, providing service for five New England states. The program provides high quality,
timely, low-cost laboratory screening, clinical follow-up and research to prevent or minimize the
effects of disorders that can lead to death, mental retardation and life-compromising conditions
in newborns.").
50. See Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); Beleno Complaint, supra
note 17; see also Becca Aaronson, Lawsuit Alleges DSHS Sold Baby DNA Samples, TEX. TRIB.
(Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-state-agencies/department-of-state-health-ser-
vices/lawsuit-alleges-dshs-sold-baby-dna-samples.
51. See Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S223-28.
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Consequently, there is a significant lack of equity in newborn
screening services across the country.52
The majority of states conduct opt-out newborn screening pro-
grams, despite the fact that during the creation of these programs in-
fluential decision makers, such as the American Medical Association
(AMA) and scientific researchers concentrating in metabolic disease,
advocated for newborn screening programs to be consent based.53
Refusal provisions allow parents to opt out for any reason in some
states, but only for religious reasons in others. Most states collect and
test newborn samples after providing little, if any, educational primers
to the parents.54 In fact, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, and South
Dakota do not currently provide any statutory grounds for refusal to
participate.55 The reality is that many of these tests on newborns are
likely conducted in the midst of parental unawareness, due in part to
the lack of required parental education.56
As of early 2009, only Maryland, Wyoming, and the District of Co-
lumbia had opt-in newborn screening programs requiring explicit con-
sent for screening from at least one biological parent or guardian.57
All three of these jurisdictions require parental education before
screening.58 Maryland has since modified its regulatory practices, ef-
fective March 2009, and no longer requires retention of documented
parental consent, but it still allows for refusal based on any reason,
effectively switching from an opt-in program to an opt-out program. 59
Some states, such as Massachusetts, have adopted a mixed-consent
program that is opt-Out based on religious reasons for the "routine"
52. Id. at S212.
53. Paul, supra note 32 (discussing the opposition to mandatory screening by the AMA and
many medical societies and researchers in the field who "believed it premature to mandate that
every infant be tested for PKU").
54. See Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S226-28.
55. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5431 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-19-201 to -211 (2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-519 to -524 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-24-17 to -25 (1994).
56. See Foral, supra note 7, at 109 ("This routine testing of newborns seems relatively uncom-
plicated and has, in fact, become a part of common practice and accepted public policy with little
thought having been given to the implications." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
57. See Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S226-28; see also Botkin, supra note 22, at 164.
58. Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S226-28; see also H.B. 0119, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo.
2009) (amending Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-801(c) to require parental education).
59. See Mo. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, 2008 LEGISLATIVE REPORT: SHOULD A
COORDINATED STATEWIDE SYSTEM FOR SCREENING NEWBORN INFANTS BE APPLIED TO ALL
NEWBORN INFANTS IN MARYLAND? (2008), available at http://dhmh.state.md.us/labs/pdf/
HB0216 FHANewbornScreening.pdf [hereinafter MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE REPORT].
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testing, which includes disorders thought to be treatable. 60 In addition
to the "routine" testing, there is an additional disease panel available;
this "optional" testing is opt-in, requiring parental consent to partici-
pate and screening for disorders that the Massachusetts Department
of Health has determined are not yet supported by "enough evidence
to require (mandate) routine newborn screening." 61 The optional
testing includes diseases that are being investigated in terms of the
extent of benefit gained from newborn screening, the frequency with
which the disorders occur, and the accuracy of the screening tests for
the disorders. 62 There is a small subset of opt-out states that do re-
quire consent for follow-up treatment or to disclose medical
information. 63
1. Opt-in Programs
a. Wyoming
From the beginning, Wyoming has shown a commitment to provid-
ing an opt-in newborn screening program. Wyoming's newborn
screening program explicitly states that "[i]nformed consent of par-
ents shall be obtained" and requires educational information regard-
ing the testing procedures, the diseases screened, and the
consequences of participating in or refusing screening. 64 As originally
proposed by the Wyoming legislature in 1980, the Newborn Screening
for Metabolic Diseases Act did not address informed consent.65 How-
ever, prior to the bill's passage, the legislature added explicit language
to ensure informed consent was obtained.66 In addition, Wyoming has
no statutory limitations for refusal of testing.67 As more recent
amendments to the newborn screening program have been enacted
(adding a newborn hearing screening program and parental education
requirements), no changes have been made to the consent-based as-
60. Routine Screening, NEW ENG. NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM, http://www.umassmed.
edu/nbs/screenings/routine/index.aspx?linkidentifier=id&itemid=65324 (last visited Nov. 14,
2011) (disease panel screened includes only those disorders "thought to be treatable").
61. Optional Screening, NEW ENG. NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM, http://www.umassmed.
edu/nbs/screenings/optionalindex.aspx?linkidentifier=id&itemid=65322 (last visited Nov. 14,
2011) (disease panel screened includes those disorders for which "there is not yet enough evi-
dence to require (mandate) routine newborn screening for the disorders included").
62. Id.
63. See Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S226-28. (showing that Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, and others require consent to disclose information and that Kansas requires consent
for follow-up treatment).
64. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-801(c) (2011).
65. S.F. 69, 45th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 1980).
66. 1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws 42-43.
67. Id.
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pect of the program in spite of the clear minority in which Wyoming
sits as an opt-in program. 68
b. The District of Columbia
The District of Columbia's newborn screening program also re-
quires informed consent: the "hospital and maternity center shall in-
form the parent(s) of the availability of these tests and shall, unless
parental consent is withheld . .. ,take appropriate blood samples for
analysis . . . ."69 The testing must be "wholly voluntary," and each
parent must be "fully informed of the purpose of testing" and be
"given a reasonable opportunity to object to such testing."70  Al-
though it is not identified as an informed consent program in its statu-
tory language as clearly as Wyoming, the now-defunct President's
Council on Bioethics 7' characterized the District of Columbia pro-
gram as requiring informed consent. 72 With respect to the informa-
tion that must be disclosed to parents, the District of Columbia
newborn screening law also requires that
[a]ll participants ... be informed of the nature of risks involved in
participation in such a program or project, be informed of the na-
ture and cost of available therapies or maintenance programs for
those affected by metabolic disorders, and be informed of the possi-
ble benefits and risks of such therapies and programs . . . .
68. See H.B. 0119, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws 178. The Wyoming House Bill
would amend § 35-4-801(c) with the following statement requiring informed consent: "The de-
partment of health shall provide educational information to healthcare providers for distribution
to the parent containing information on the testing procedures, the diseases being screened and
the consequences of screening or nonscreening." Id.
69. D.C. CODE § 7-833 (2001).
70. Id. § 7-834(3). The language of the District of Columbia code details a voluntary program
where consent is obtained from parents informed of the procedure.
71. The President's Council on Bioethics was established in 2001 by President George W.
Bush and comprised of a group of individuals appointed by him to "advise the President on
bioethical issues that may emerge as a consequence of advances in biomedical science and tech-
nology." Exec. Order No. 13,237, 3 C.F.R. § 821 (2001).
72. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS. THE CHANGING MORAL Focus OF NEWBORN
SCREENING 89 (2008), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/newborn-
screening/Newborn%20Screening%20for%20the%20web.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COUN-
CIL ON BIOETHICS REPORT] ("In Maryland, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia, newborn
screening explicitly requires informed parental consent.").
73. D.C. CODE § 7-834(3)(C).
882 [Vol. 61:869
NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAMS
2. Opt-out Programs
a. Texas
Texas's newborn screening program allows for exemptions based
only on religious reasons.7 4 To refuse screening in Texas, a parent
must be a member of a "recognized religious organization, the teach-
ings of which are contrary to the testing requirement."7 5 The hospital
is then required "to inform the parent of the consequences of refusal
(possible infant death or retardation) and require the parent to com-
plete a statement indicating the declination of newborn screening." 76
This statement is retained in the infant's medical records.77
A group of parents recently challenged Texas's newborn screening
program as unconstitutional for authorizing research use of blood
samples without parental consent.78 In Beleno v. Texas Department of
State Health Services, parents alleged that the Texas Newborn Screen-
ing Program, which permitted newborns' dried blood specimens to be
retained after they were used for mandated disease screening and
later made available to researchers without parental consent, consti-
tuted an unconstitutional search and seizure.79 The case settled with
no monetary award to the plaintiffs, but the state agreed to destroy
more than five million blood samples collected over a seven-year pe-
riod and to disclose how the samples were used.s0
Legislators responded by making changes to the newborn screening
program.81 The Texas legislature explicitly considered both opt-in and
opt-out choices, but ultimately maintained an opt-out program with
disclosure requirements, reasoning that economic savings and avoid-
ance of logistical difficulties outweighed constitutional concerns. 82
Prior to the Beleno settlement, the legislators proposed modifications
to the statute concerning the elective destruction of newborn samples,
74. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 33.012(a) (West 2010) ("Screening tests may not
be administered to a newborn child whose parents, managing conservator, or guardian objects on
the ground that the tests conflict with the religious tenets or practices of an organized church of
which they are adherents." (emphasis added)).
75. Newborn Screening-Specimen Collection Requirements, TEX. DEP'T STATE HEALTH
SERvS., http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/LAB/nbs-collect-reqs.shtm (last updated Feb. 8, 2011).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Beleno Complaint, supra note 17.
79. See id at 3, 5; see also Carnahan, supra note 4, at 305-09; Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Legal
Regulation of Banking Newborn Blood Spots for Research: How Bearder and Beleno Resolved
the Question of Consent, 11 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 1, 29-34 (2011).
80. Dana Barnes, Texas DNA Showdown, MAYBORN, 2010, at 40, 40.
81. See id.; see also H.B. 1672, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009).
82. See HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., MAJOR ISSUES OF THE 81ST LEGISLATURE, REGULAR SES-
SION AND FIRST CALLED SESSION 129 (2009).
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the confidentiality of the samples collected, and the information ob-
tained from them. 3 The original bill did not require a disclosure
statement about retention of genetic materials, nor did it provide au-
thorization for parents to request sample destruction; however, the
bill was amended to address these issues. 84 The new statute requires
notification of the screening program, classifies information relating to
newborn screening as confidential and not subject to subpoena or dis-
closure (except as provided by the bill), and provides parents with the
opportunity to (1) limit the use of the genetic material through a writ-
ten statement prohibiting use for any purpose other than the newborn
screening tests authorized under the statute and (2) prohibit retention
of the sample through a written statement, upon which the sample will
be destroyed after sixty days.8 5 Parents who allow the use of their
newborn's samples in medical research are informed that the blood
samples are "de-identified" to maintain confidentiality so that recipi-
ents cannot trace the specimens back to the newborn submitting the
sample.86
Supporters highlighted the fact that the amendments "provide a
straightforward method by which parents could direct [the Depart-
ment of State Health Services (DSHS)] to destroy their children's ge-
netic material so it could not be used for future research."87
Supporters also noted that the amendments acknowledge the "invalu-
able public health purpose" that newborn samples serve while honor-
ing the wishes of "parents [who] have personal concerns about the
retention of their children's genetic material."88 Even if parents' con-
cerns arise at a later date, their awareness of the program and the
83. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 33 (West 2010); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN.
§ 58.103 (West 2004); H.B. 1672; HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., MAJOR ISSUES OF THE 81ST LEGISLA-
TURE, REGULAR SESSION AND FIRST CALLED SESSION 129 (2009); see also Barnes, supra note 80,
at 40-41 ("Even before the settlement, legislators voted overwhelmingly to require notification
and allow parents to opt-out of the post-screening testing program. Since mid-2009, when the
state was required by the new law to give new parents a disclosure form, only 7 percent have
chosen to opt out of the program. For parents who want to support medical research that might
come from the spots, the health department's website offers reassurance that blood samples
given to researchers are 'de-identified' so that recipients 'cannot trace the specimen back to the
baby from which it came.'").
84. See H. JOURNAL, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1053 (Tex. 2009).
85. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 33.
86. See id. § 33.017. The Code of Federal Regulations defines "de-identified" as "[h]ealth
information that does not identify an individual and with respect to which there is no reasonable
basis to believe that the information can be used to identify an individual." 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.514(a) (2005); see also Barnes, supra note 80, at 40-41 (explaining the privacy risks associ-
ated with DNA research using a blood card and the possibility of identifying a sample based on
genetic similarities to relatives' DNA, which may be known or in an accessible database).
87. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 82, at 128.
88. Id.
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option of sample destruction can still be exercised. 89 Supporters fur-
ther argued that an informed consent process would be "unnecessarily
burdensome and costly to the state and health providers," as well as
"unnecessary in light of current privacy safeguards," such as de-
identification and a structured research request process. 90
An additional justification given by supporters for a mandatory pro-
grams addressed the potential for a consent-based system's "elaborate
nature" to cause "alarm among parents who previously would not
have been concerned about retention of the genetic material." 91 Ac-
cordingly, supporters postulate this alarm would result in a "dispro-
portionate number of parents . . . declin[ing] consent" and fewer
newborns being screened. 92 The Senate Research Center's Bill Anal-
ysis also noted that it would be "impractical to obtain and track writ-
ten consent for each de-identified piece of information that could help
with quality assurance and program improvement because of the vol-
ume of newborn screening results (nearly 800,000 per year)." 93
Opponents of the amendments argued that, while the modifications
require parents to be informed about the retention of samples, they
provide no method to ensure that all parents are in fact made aware of
the retention process and how they can prohibit the use of their child's
sample.94 Though a parent may be comfortable with the current per-
missible uses of the retained samples, there is the possibility that mod-
ifications or expansions of the permissible uses may fall outside some
parents' comfort zone.95 Opponents stated:
By using an informed consent or "opt-in" process, there would be
no question about whether a parent was aware that the genetic ma-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 129 (asserting that, for the DSHS to provide collection, storage and tracking of
consent forms would be a costly, extensive process that is unnecessary due to assurances of
sample protection of de-identification and limited sample access). As a parallel, the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services' policy for waiver of informed consent of human re-
search subjects includes consideration of the practical nature of testing, public health benefits at
issue, risk of procedure to patients and rights and welfare of the subjects. 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.116(c)-(d).
91. HoUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 82, at 129 ("The genetic material legally obtained
through the newborn screening program meets the definition of a state record .... As such, this
material may be retained for an appropriate amount of time as dictated by state records reten-
tion statutes. Despite this fact, some have expressed concerns that the retention constitutes an
unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Such concerns are unfounded because passive consent to retention of the materials would be
implicit when parents knew that they could request that the genetic material be destroyed, but
did not.").
92. Id.
93. SENATE RESEARCH CTR., H.B. 1672 BILL ANALYSIS 1 (Tex. 2009).
94. See HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 82, at 129.
95. Id.
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terial was retained. With a 'consent form, parents could indicate
through signed acknowledgement that they understood and con-
sented to the retention policies and possible uses of genetic
materials. 96
Opponents cautioned the legislature that the opt-out approach of
genetic material retention "affirm[s] in statute a contestable moral
judgment that the potential for some measure of public good super-
sedes the privacy concerns of an individual." 97 These opponents
poignantly emphasized that if research uses of retained genetic mate-
rial were so valuable to the public health, the extra cost98 and adminis-
trative process to ensure protection of privacy concerns should not be
problematic.9 9
Andrea Beleno, a plaintiff in Beleno, would have preferred a modi-
fication that changed Texas's opt-out program to an opt-in program:100
I just wanted people to have the choice to opt-in or opt-out, and for
the most part, it's not a perfect system in my eyes, but they have it
now . . . . They should look at that form and decide for themselves
and their families what is the best choice for them. 01
96. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., H.B. 1672 BILL ANALYSIs 5 (Tex. 2009).
97. Id. at 5-6.
98. See AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES REPORT, supra note 40, at 8.
99. See HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 82, at 6 ("If the public health outcomes of the
research conducted on retained genetic material are considered valuable, then it should be worth
the cost and extra administrative process to ensure that privacy concerns are protected.").
100.
[Andrea Beleno] has concerns with the new Texas law, too. She would prefer that
parents could opt-in, rather than opt-out....
To Andrea, the complexities surrounding this issue can obscure the point. "It's not
about politics, it's not about science, it's about consent and it's about parents' responsi-
bility to make decisions for their kids," she says. Ironically, she would have willingly
consented if they had asked her permission. Now, however, she distrusts the govern-
ment. "Once you have a state agency that will bold-faced lie to you once," she says,
"you don't know what else they might be lying about."
If Andrea has another baby, she says, "There is no way I would consent to having my
kid's DNA be part of the sample because I just don't trust 'em."
Barnes, supra note 80, at 42.
101. Id. at 45. The reporter who initially uncovered the controversy that led to the Beleno
case also felt the issue of consent was critical, asserting that it was not the storage and research
use of the samples that was a personal issue for her, but rather the fact that they were collected
and used without any notification and consent of the parents.
"I don't really fear Big Brother. I'm not one of those people," [the reporter] says. She
understands the point of having an mtDNA research database. "I don't see a whole
heck of a lot of problem."
She did, however, see a problem with the lack of consent. "What I tried to be careful
about with this story but what got lost in the blogosphere was . .. I did not believe that
these blood spots were being used for nefarious purposes like a lot of my readers did."
She did feel the state and federal government "were not revealing something that was
being done with taxpayer dollars because they feared how people would respond," she
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b. Minnesota
Minnesota's newborn screening statute10 2 explicitly authorizes a
general refusal to participate not limited to religious reasons. 103 The
statute directs the Minnesota Department of Health to inform parents
that the samples will be used for testing and that the results of those
tests and the samples themselves will be retained by the Department
of Health.104 In addition, the test administrator must inform the par-
ents or legal guardians of the benefits of retaining the blood samples
and provide them with the alternatives of declining testing or having
samples destroyed within twenty-four months after testing.105 Any
objection or election of an alternative must be signed by the parent or
legal guardian and recorded in the infant's medical record.106
In a 2007 public hearing discussing potential changes to the Minne-
sota screening program, Twila Brase, President of Citizens' Council on
Health Care, addressed the proposed revisions.107 Specifically, Brase
criticized the fact that, although the health department had developed
a parent brochure and possessed opt-out forms for parents to sign,
there was no requirement to notify hospitals that the law obligated
them to inform parents of their ability to (1) refuse all testing by the
state's newborn screening program or (2) request that the infant's
sample be destroyed within two years.10 The current statutory lan-
guage ensures these informed dissent choices because it explicitly
states that parties with a duty to perform newborn testing "shall ad-
vise parents" that they have the options of declining testing or electing
two-year sample destruction.109 Among the proposed modifications
says. "And if you fear how people are going to respond, maybe you shouldn't be doing
something in the first place."
Id. at 42-43 (second alteration in original).
102. MINN. STAT. §§ 144.125-128 (2011).
103. See id. § 144.125 subd. 3; see also MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, INSTRUCTIONS: REFUSAL OF
NEWBORN BLOOD SCREENING (2003), available at http://www.cchconline.org/pdf/nbsrefusein-
structions_01-03.pdf.
104. MINN. STAT. § 144.125 subd. 3; see also MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 103.
105. MINN. STAT. § 144.125 subd. 3; see also MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 103.
106. MINN. STAT. § 144.125 subd. 3; see also MINN. DEPT OF HEALTH, supra note 103.
107. See generally TWILA BRASE, CITIZENS' COUNCIL ON HEALTHCARE, COMBINED WRITTEN
TESTIMONY AND SUBMITTED POST-HEARING COMMENTS: PROPOSED REVISION OF MINNESOTA
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH NEWBORN SCREENING RULE 4615 (2007), available at http://www.oah.
state.mn.us/cases/health4615/nbs-pc8.pdf.
108. Id. at 2.
109. MINN. STAT. § 144.125 subd. 3 ("Persons with a duty to perform testing ... shall advise
parents of infants . . . (3) that the following options are available to them with respect to the
testing: (i) to decline to have the tests, or (ii) to elect to have the tests but to require that all
blood samples and records of test results be destroyed within 24 months of the testing."); see also
MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 103.
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to the Minnesota program was a requirement that the refusal forms be
written in a simpler, shorter manner so as to not intimidate parents
from making that choice and that the requirement that a secondary
witness sign the refusal forms be eliminated.110 The latter of these
changes was incorporated into the statutory language, now requiring
only one parent or legal guardian to sign the refusal form, which is
kept in the infant's medical records."n
In Bearder v. State, a group of families sued the state alleging that
biological samples and genetic information of their newborn infants,
obtained during the newborn screenings, constituted private data on
individuals subject to Minnesota's Genetic Privacy Act.112 "Unless
otherwise expressly provided by law," the Genetic Privacy Act prohib-
its "collection, storage, use, and dissemination of genetic information"
without "written informed consent."113 The plaintiffs argued that, de-
spite the fact that another Minnesota statute mandated the newborn
screening program, the Minnesota Department of Health was bound
by the Genetic Privacy Act to ask parents' permission to collect, store,
and test infants' DNA. 114
Affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the appel-
late court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that the newborn
screening program acts as "an 'express' provision of law that autho-
rizes collection, retention, use and dissemination of blood specimens
for the newborn screening program, making the genetic privacy act
inapplicable."115 In response to the concern for sample use unrelated
to the newborn screening program, the appellate court held that these
uses would be subject to the written informed consent requirements of
the Genetic Privacy Act.116 Ultimately, because only nine of the
twenty-five infants involved in the litigation had their samples col-
lected after the newborn screening program became effective and
none of those samples had been used in any public health studies or
research, the court determined that the plaintiffs "failed to either pre-
sent specific facts showing there was a genuine issue for trial, or to
offer substantial evidence to support their genetic privacy act claim, or
110. BRASE, supra note 107, at 15-16.
111. See MINN. STAT. § 144.125 subd. 3; see also MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 103.
112. Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144, 144-45 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); see also Carnahan,
supra note 4, at 310-12; Drabiak-Syed, supra note 79, at 24-29.
113. MINN. STAT. § 13.386 subd. 3.
114. Bearder, 788 N.W.2d at 149.
115. Id. at 150.
116. Id. ("While the newborn screening statute permits use of newborn screening specimens
for purposes related to that program, it does not provide for the specimen remainders to be used
for purposes outside the newborn screening program.").
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their other claims for tort, violation of privacy, or governmental
taking."117
In the aftermath of Bearder, the Minnesota legislature has yet to
pass a new statute, but it is currently considering at least three bills
that would modify the Minnesota newborn screening program. 18
One of the bills, H.F. 1341, would establish that the samples and data
collected under the Minnesota Department of Health's newborn
screening program are "not subject to the general genetic information
provision of the Data Practices Act. 119 It would additionally establish
"new requirements for informing parents about the screening process
and options related to the collection and use of their infants' genetic
data."1 20 Specifically, the bill would require that parents be informed
of their rights to object to the testing and storage of samples, while
permitting the Minnesota Department of Health to store and use
blood samples for up to twenty-four months. Additionally, the De-
partment of Health could use and store the blood samples "for indi-
vidual health-related studies, or for another purpose" upon written
informed consent of the parents.121
H.F. 1341 would effectively create an opt-in provision for parents to
elect indefinite retention of the blood samples by the state. Whereas
the current statute requires a parental signature to limit sample reten-
tion to twenty-four months, the proposed statute would require a pa-
rental signature to retain samples for an indefinite period that may
also include research use, making twenty-four month disposal the op-
erating norm. This does not change the overall structure of the pro-
posed bill as an opt-in provision; rather, it seems to create a program
that collects and retains samples for only twenty-four months and pro-
vides alternatives to the parent to opt in for longer storage and future
research use. At the least, the bill provides more options to parents
after mandatory disclosure of the program.
Another bill, S.F. 1478, would create a newborn screening program
that is opt-out yet seemingly provides a variety of options available to
parents, allowing a more tailored choice in the newborn screening
117. Id. at 151 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. See H.F. 1341, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009); S.F. 1478, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn.
2009); S.F. 3138, 2007-2008th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2007). S.F. 3138 was introduced in 2008, but it
was vetoed by Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty due to its failure to require "written informed
consent . . . for long-term storage or use of the blood samples for non-screening research."
Drabiak-Syed, supra note 79, at 20-21 & n.107.
119. MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BILL SUMMARY H.F. 1341 (2009), available at
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/bs/86/HF1341.html.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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program for their child. For example, parents could dictate the al-
lowed uses and retention time of the samples.122 Incorporating the
court's ruling in Bearder, S.F. 1478 would modify the current Genetic
Privacy Act to include a statement explicitly exempting the newborn
screening program from the statute.123 In addition, the bill would
modify the newborn screening statute to require disclosure of the
newborn screening test to parents.124 Specifically, the bill would re-
quire disclosure of the purpose of collecting the sample; the fact that
the sample would be retained for two years and that it "may be used
for public health studies and research"; and a discussion of the bene-
fits of testing and consequences of a decision of refusal to participate
or refusal to retain samples for more than two years. 125 The bill would
provide parents four options: (1) participating in the screening pro-
gram without modification; (2) participating in the screening program,
but only allow the sample to be retained for twenty-four months; (3)
participating in the screening program, but not allow the sample to be
used in "public health studies and research"; or (4) refusing to partici-
pate in the screening program. 126
The language of S.F. 1478 differs slightly from H.F. 1341 in regard
to the time frame of sample retention. While H.F. 1341 provides for a
baseline retention of twenty-four months (unless otherwise allowed by
signature of a parent, effectively opting in to longer storage), 127 S.F.
1478 implies retention for longer than twenty-four months by provid-
ing the option of electing for the shortened twenty-four month period
(effectively opting out of a longer storage).128 While S.F. 1478 may
seem more favorable to parents' rights because it presents more op-
tions for election of retention time and research use than H.F. 1341,
the standard indefinite sample retention timeframe of S.F. 1478 with
research use could be less favorable to the parent and newborn, as this
option seems limitless in terms of how the sample is later used and
disseminated.
122. See S.F. 1478.
123. See id. ("[Tihe Department of Health's collection, storage, use, and dissemination of ge-
netic information and blood specimens for testing infants for heritable and congenital disorders
are governed by sections 144.125 to 144.128.").
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. H.F. 1341, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009).
128. S.F. 1478.
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c. Maryland
Maryland's voluntary newborn screening program states, "Partici-
pation in a hereditary and congenital disorders program should be
wholly voluntary, and all information obtained about any individual in
a hereditary and congenital disorders program should be kept confi-
dential . . . ."129 Maryland's Code of Regulations governs the proto-
cols by which practitioners implement the Maryland newborn
screening program. Previously, these regulations required obtaining
informed parental consent.130 However, in 2008, the Maryland De-
partment of Health and Mental Hygiene submitted a report commis-
sioned by the Maryland legislature upon consideration of House Bill
216.131 The Maryland Legislative Report addressed whether a coordi-
nated, statewide system for screening newborn infants in the state for
certain hereditary and congenital disorders should be applied to all
newborn infants in the state and whether such a program should be-
come a mandatory opt-out program. The Report emphasized that ma-
jor national professional groups and federal agencies, such as the
Newborn Screening Taskforce, recommended allowing parents to re-
fuse newborn screening. 132 The Newborn Screening Taskforce con-
vened by the American Academy of Pediatrics recommended that
"[p]arents should be informed of testing and have an opportunity to
refuse testing; and . . . if after discussions about newborn screening
129. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-102 (LexisNexis repl. vol. 2009). The statutory
language of the Maryland Public Health Code Annotated § 13-109 provides for the parent to be
fully informed and provided an opportunity to object. See id. § 13-109.
130. See Mo. CODE REGS. 10.52.12.05 (2002) ("Before administration of the test, the parent
or guardian shall be informed fully of the reasons for the test and of his or her legal right to
refuse to have the test performed on the child. An individual who has been provided and has
signed a written explanation of the test approved and furnished by the Department shall be
considered fully informed.").
131. MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 59.
132. Id.
In 2000, a very influential national Newborn Screening Taskforce was convened by the
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and funded by the Maternal and Child Health
Bureau (MCHB) of the federal Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA) to make recommendations for the future of newborn screening. This taskforce
was co-sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the
Association of Maternal and Child Health Progra1ms (AMCHP), the Association of
Public Health Laboratories (APHL), the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials (ASTHO), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). the Ge-
netic Alliance and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The report of this taskforce,
entitled "Serving the Family from Birth to the Medical Home-Report of the Newborn
Screening Taskforce," was published in Pediatrics 106: 383-427 (2000).
Id. at 2.
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with health care professionals, parents refuse to have their newborn
tested, the refusal should be documented in writing and honored."133
In addition, the Maryland Legislative Report highlighted statistical
analyses of consent-based programs, which conclusively demonstrated
that most parents do not refuse newborn screening programs, stating
that the twenty-four states that track their refusals "[d]ocumented re-
fusal rates . .. from 0.004% to 0.8%, with most of these states having
less than 0.2% refusals." 134 Perhaps even more impressive, in 2007,
the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene found that
the Maryland program screened 78,738 infants and only three parents
refused,135 which corresponds to a state refusal rate of 0.000038%.
The report went on to disclose that nine infants in approximately
seventy-one million over the course of seventeen years had been
"missed" due to parental refusal.136 This corresponds to a rate of one
in 10,000,000, or 0.00001%, of babies born, a number that is signifi-
cantly lower than that for infants missed due to false negative test
results (.001% for TMS techniques; 10% for cystic fibrosis; and
7%-12% for hypothyroidism).137
The Maryland Legislative Report also emphasized the "prevailing
concern about the effects of mandating screening [as] intrusion of gov-
ernment into medical care and the family" and the fears "that
mandatory newborn screening could set a precedent for mandatory
governmental programs in other areas where it is clearly inappropri-
ate."138 The Report concluded that the statewide newborn screening
program "should be applied to all newborn infants unless the parents
or guardians of the infant object."139 The Report supported informing
parents about the program and providing them with educational
materials strongly recommending the program, but the Report recom-
mended "that written documentation of consent should no longer be
required." 140
133. Id.; see also Newborn Screening Taskforce, Serving the Family from Birth to the Medical
Home, 106 PEDIATRICS 383, 387 (2000).
134. MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 59, at 3.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. ("It is not surprising that relatively few missed cases were identified because very few
parents refuse and because the disorders themselves are quite rare. More babies are missed
because of false negative results.").
138. Id. at 4.
139. Id.
140. MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 59, at 3.
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Consequently, Maryland has adopted a refusal-based, opt-out pro-
gram.141 According to the Maryland Department of Health website,
"If you decide you really do not want your baby to have newborn
screening, someone from the state health department will also call you
to discuss newborn screening. You do have the right to decline
screening (this is called opting out)." 1 4 2 Although Maryland has re-
cently switched from an opt-in to an opt-out newborn screening pro-
gram, there is still a requirement to inform parents about the
screening, but education is only encouraged and not mandated by
statute.
3. "Refusal Prohibited" Programs
The statutory language establishing the newborn screening pro-
grams of Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, and South Dakota provides
no grounds for refusing to participate.143 Additionally, Nebraska has
never allowed parents to refuse. 14 4 There is no correlation between
states that provide no statutory basis for refusal and the states' sample
retention times, given that three of the four states have some of the
shortest sample retention times and Michigan has the longest sample
retention times.'4 5
4. Federal Attempts at Uniformity: National Funding and Program
Guidelines
The Newborn Screening Saves Lives Act of 2007 (Newborn Act)
became federal law in April 2008.146 The Newborn Act's purpose is to
141. The regulatory language has been modified to provide for an opportunity to object to
testing rather than the need for obtaining written approval to conduct testing. Compare Mo.
CODE REGS. 10.52.12.06 (2009) (requiring health care providers to explain the reasons for the
newborn screening program with parents and to provide an explanation of their right to object to
having the testing performed without requiring a signature from the parent unless refusing the
test), with MD. CODE REGs. 10.52.12.05 (1994) (requiring the signature of parents who have
received explanations of the reasons for the testing and their right to refuse, as a demonstration
that the parents are "fully informed.").
142. Newborn Screening Frequently Asked Questions, MD. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HY-
GIENE, http://www.dhmh.state.md.us/labs/html/nbsfaq.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
143. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5431 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-19-201 to -211 (2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-519 to -524 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-24-17 to -25 (1994); see
also Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S227-28.
144. MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 59, at 2.
145. Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S223-25 (showing two months in South Dakota, six to
eight weeks in Montana, and three months in Nebraska, while Michigan's sample retention is
indefinite).
146. Bill Summary and Status, Lis. CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dllO:SNO1
858:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Nov. 6, 2011); see also S. 1858: Newborn Screening Saves
Lives Act of 2007, GovTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-1858 (last vis-
ited Nov. 6, 2011).
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"amend the Public Health Service Act to establish grant programs to
provide for education and outreach on newborn screening and coordi-
nated followup care once newborn screening has been conducted." 14 7
It encourages limiting the panel of heritable disorders tested to those
that "significantly impact public health."I 4 8 In addition, the Newborn
Act requires the development of a model decision matrix for expan-
sion of the screening programs to include disorders that have a "po-
tential public health impact.""49 The Newborn Act encourages states
to "include recommendations, advice, or information dealing with ...
the availability and reporting of testing for conditions for which there
is no existing treatment; . . . [and] public and provider awareness and
education." 5 0
In terms of research uses of newborn samples, the Newborn Act
sets out a Newborn Screening Research Program by which the Secre-
tary and the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) may
coordinate and expand research in newborn screening to include
(A) identifying, developing, and testing the most promising new
screening technologies, in order to improve already existing screen-
ing tests, increase the specificity of newborn screening, and expand
the number of conditions for which screening tests are available;
(B) experimental treatments and disease management strategies
for additional newborn conditions, and other genetic, metabolic,
hormonal and or functional conditions that can be detected through
newborn screening for which treatment is not yet available . . . .x15
The Newborn Act provides a sort of "catch-all" phrase authorizing the
NIH Director to identify and conduct "other activities that would im-
prove newborn screening."1 5 2 However, it does not address the issues
of consent, right of refusal, or any other privacy issues surrounding
sample collection.
147. See S. 1858, 110th Cong. (2008).
148. Id. § 4. S. 1858 modifies the duties of the Advisory Committee on Heritable Disorders in
Newborns and Children to include additional duties, such as
mak[ing] systematic evidence-based and peer-reviewed recommendations that include
the heritable disorders that have the potential to significantly impact public health for
which all newborns should be screened, including secondary conditions that may be
identified as a result of the laboratory methods used for screening; [and] develop[ing] a
model decision-matrix for newborn screening expansion, including an evaluation of the
potential public health impact of such expansion, and periodically updat[ing] the rec-
ommended uniform screening panel, as appropriate, based on such decision-matrix.
Id. § 4.
149. Id. § 4.
150. Id. § 2.
151. Id. § 7 (emphases added).
152. Id.
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In sum, the failure of the Newborn Act to address the role of con-
sent is troubling, particularly in light of the permissive approach to
expansion of the disorders screened, some of which have no known
treatment. According to Twila Brase, the Newborn Act has problems
stemming from the lack of consent and inclusion of expanded testing,
the storage of genetic information in nationalized government
databases and registries, the government's ability to track individuals
with certain disorders, the availability of biological samples for re-
search without consent, and the coercive nature of the programs'
funding.153
A report from the now-defunct President's Council on Bioethics
discussed the "prudent course" of offering mandatory screening only
for situations in which the benefits outweigh the risks and burdens. 54
Any conditions that do not satisfy this clear balancing test would re-
quire voluntary, informed consent. 55 The report also proposed a
mixed-consent approach to screening that does not wholly adopt a
mandatory or informed consent model, reflecting the approach
adopted by Massachusetts. 156 As the report stated, this approach is
"one that integrates mandatory screening for treatable conditions with
elective or optional screening for as yet untreatable conditions that
are appropriate targets for biomedical research."' 57
III. ANALYSIS
To analyze the newborn screening programs in the United States,
this Part highlights the pertinent lessons learned from state statutes,
case law, and the national efforts towards uniformity, focusing in par-
ticular on Maryland, Texas, Minnesota, and the impact of recent legis-
lative and judicial decisions. This Part explores and analyzes the
justifications for opt-out versus opt-in newborn screening programs
against the backdrop of recent litigations. Finally, it proposes model
guidelines for a newborn screening program that appropriately pro-
tects the privacy rights of parents and infants by ensuring proper
choice and education of parents and legal guardians.
153. See generally BRASE, supra note 14.
154. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIoETHIcs REPORT, supra note 72.
155. Id.
156. See generally id. at 85-86; NEW ENO. NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM, supra note 49.
The New England program provides tiers of testing for routine and optional testing and also
contains information about pilot studies. Id. The New England program provides ready access
to all this information through its website with information specific to parents and brochures in
eight different languages explaining the program and its purpose. Id.
157. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS REPORT, supra note 72, at 86.
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A. Lessons from Current Legislative Debates
The recent legal disputes surrounding Texas's and Minnesota's new-
born screening programs and the legislative reports during Maryland's
flip-flop to an opt-out program provide the justifications for adopting
opt-out screening programs. First looking to Texas, the fact that the
Beleno litigation resulted in settlement leaves little judicial interpreta-
tion for analysis, but perhaps equally important is the legislative de-
bate that surrounded the post-Beleno bill. This debate demonstrates
that while the concerns of parental and newborn privacy arising from
Beleno may be somewhat alleviated by an opt-out program requiring
disclosure of retention and options for sample destruction, the con-
cerns are not entirely addressed.
In electing to maintain an opt-out program, the Texas legislature
expressed concern for the burden and cost to the state and health care
providers that an informed consent process would impose. 58 This ar-
gument seems disingenuous from a state that presumably has an ad-
ministrative infrastructure with data management technologies and a
tax base that could support the large state population and ensure the
protection of the its citizens' rights. Texas is the largest state in the
contiguous United States with a 2010 population of 25,145,561159 (of
which approximately 1.5% or 400,000 are newborns), 160 and it rou-
tinely maintains records for its citizens, such as motor vehicle records,
birth certificates, public school records, state medical institution
records, and records from various other state-sponsored programs.
Although a practical and real issue, the financial hurdle to implement
an opt-in or informed consent program is well worth the assurances
and guarantees awarded to protection of parents and infants' privacy
rights.
158. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 96, at 4 ("DSHS would have to carry out an exten-
sive process to develop the consent form, a system for consent form submission, and a system to
store the forms and track whether a parent had granted consent. The associated costs would be
particularly unnecessary in light of current privacy safeguards as well as those included in CSHB
1672. Not only is all personally identifiable information removed from the specimens, but only
DSHS staff has access to the personal information database, and the research request process is
structured to protect confidentiality."). The Texas state legislature is not the only state voicing
its attrition to change due to burden and costs. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 79, at 36-37 ("Cal-
ifornia Department of Health Services echoed this problematic rhetoric that research should
trump individual interests when it decided to retain [newborn screening] samples for additional
research without consent.").
159. Texas Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUs BUREAu, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
48000.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
160. See Texas Population Projections for Children 18 and Younger, TEX. HEALTH & Hum.
SERVS. COMM'N, http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/research/dssi/popstats/projectionstx-agegrpschild.
html (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
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As discussed previously, the Texas legislature determined that the
"elaborate nature" of a consent-based system would "cause alarm
among parents who previously would not have been concerned about
retention of the genetic material," causing "a disproportionate num-
ber of parents to decline consent" and resulting in fewer newborns
being screened. 161 Fear of education and information is a dangerous
and threatening basis for a government to justify its decision-making
process in a truly democratic system. The task of providing concise
medical descriptions and informative materials to parents regarding
newborn screening may be difficult, but this is within the province of
the state and its oversight of the medical care provided to its citizens.
To dismiss the requirement for informed consent for fear of reduced
participation is troublesome. Citizens should be alarmed by a state
government's hesitancy to implement programs that would provide
greater education and access to information regarding personal medi-
cal issues, particularly when the government believes the outcome
may be that citizens decline to participate in the state program. The
Texas legislature's reasoning is also flawed in light of the Maryland
Legislative Report showing that an opt-in program receives greater
than 99.9% participation. The state's preference for less paperwork
and lower costs does not justify the failure to fully protect the privacy
rights of its citizens.
Turning to Minnesota, although it is not clear as of yet whether the
proposed bills will be passed, it will be interesting to watch the Minne-
sota legislature in the aftermath of the recent Bearder decision, which
limited the use of samples collected from Minnesota's current opt-out
newborn screening program to only those purposes specified in the
newborn screening statute.162 Many of the proposed changes to the
Minnesota newborn screening program statute are in line with
Bearder. However, none of the proposed changes explore a transition
to an opt-in program. The Bearder court's interpretation of the stat-
ute as "expressly authoriz[ing] the commissioner to conduct health
studies in carrying out its public-health mandate to collect information
relevant to refining and improving the newborn screening program"163
is also problematic as it permits an extremely broad potential reach of
the Minnesota statute. As interpreted by the court in Bearder, al-
lowing the Minnesota commissioner to conduct health studies in order
to make improvements or refine the newborn screening program
could allow for a newborn screening program that extends to diseases
161. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 96, at 4.
162. Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
163. Id. at 149.
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that have little relevance to the primary goal of newborn screening,
which is to provide direct benefit to the child tested.164
The potential exists for inclusion of conditions that are still at the
non-therapeutic and experimental research stages in an effort to de-
termine their prevalence in the population or to identify carriers of
these conditions-a purpose arguably akin to the controversial dis-
semination and research uses of newborn samples in Beleno. Despite
the fact that research advances may later deem some of these condi-
tions worthy of inclusion in the newborn screening programs, it is not
appropriate to consider newborn screening programs a testing ground
without also requiring explicit consent from at least the parents and,
ideally, explicit consent from the subject upon reaching adulthood.
In looking at Maryland, the recent flip-flop state, the legislative de-
bates and reports provide insightful data of the high participation rate
opt-in programs generate when paired with the requirement of edu-
cating parents about the screening program and their elective choices.
The statistical analysis of the opt-in newborn screening program previ-
ously conducted in Maryland is difficult to refute; a participation rate
of more than 99.9% in a consent-based program that requires educa-
tion is impressive.165 However, the legislature used the high participa-
tion rate from their previous consent-based, opt-in program to justify
the change to an opt-out program.166
This is puzzling, as the decision to change to an opt-out program
alters a fundamental aspect of freedom of choice for the parents de-
ciding whether to have their newborn participate and may not gener-
ate a similar participation rate. The statistics are not an accurate
representation of true participation in states that do not require edu-
cation to parents making this decision, as parents cannot choose to
participate in a program they do not know about. The statistics from
Maryland show participation of greater than 99.9% are meaningful
due to the fact that Maryland's previous regulation mandated inform-
ing parents of the program and provided them a written explanation
of the test, providing an adequate opportunity for notice and for par-
ents to follow up with additional questions.167 The high participation
rate should indicate that the state's opt-in program was operating in a
164. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS REPORT, supra note 72, at 85.
165. See MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 59, at 3.
166. Id. at 4.
167. See MD. CODE REOS. 10.52.12.00-.15 (1994). 10.52.12.05 stated:
Before administration of the test, the parent or guardian shall be informed fully of the
reasons for the test and of his or her legal right to refuse to have the test performed on
the child. An individual who has been provided and has signed a written explanation of
the test approved and furnished by the Department shall be considered fully informed.
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manner that protected the vast majority of newborns from preventa-
ble illnesses while respecting their constitutional right of privacy. It is
counterintuitive to switch to an opt-out program when the parents
have been shown to make the "correct" choice in the eye of the state
and society as a whole.
The impact of refusal to test would be most readily seen by the
threat of "missing" an "ill" newborn in an opt-in screening program,
but it is still less significant than the occurrence of false positives for
"healthy" newborns in an opt-out screening program.168 Statistics
show there is little potential to have an "ill" newborn-suffering from
a disorder that the newborn screen would detect and permit necessary
immediate life-sustaining treatment-slip through the screening sys-
tem undetected in an opt-in program. "When parents refuse standard
treatment for a child who will die or become seriously ill if he or she is
not treated, the state properly intercedes to ensure treatment accord-
ing to the doctrine of parens patriae." 169 This differs from a situation
of refusing testing for an otherwise healthy newborn that is not sick
and has a less than 0.5% chance of having a disorder that is tested for
in the screening panel.
Furthermore, many of the disorders for which the newborns are
tested are not considered life threatening and do not require treat-
ment to begin at the newborn stage.170 Government reach should in-
filtrate the family only when there is a demonstrated reason to do so
(such as the parents' failure to protect or provide adequate care for
their children); absent such a demonstration, the parental control of a
family should be respected and revered by the state. The impact of
public policy, in the instance of newborn screening programs, should
not override the requirement for parental choice and education, espe-
cially when studies show that participation in an opt-in program is not
adversely affected compared to opt-out programs and research partic-
ipation may be increased. 71
Additionally, similar to the justification seen with the Texas legisla-
ture, the Maryland legislature's justification of "lightening the
paperwork burden on hospitals and providers" is weak when balanced
against the rights of a parent and a child to have full control over their
168. AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATEs REPORT, supra note 40, at 7 ("There is a possibility that
children may actually be harmed when unnecessarily placed on medications or restricted diets,
and that false-positive results may have a psychological impact on parents who experience guilt
and distress over the long-term health of their child." (footnotes omitted)).
169. MARYLAND LEGISLATIvE REPORT, supra note 59, at 3.
170. Id. at 4.
171. See Tarini et al., supra note 23, at 128-30.
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biological and genetic information.172 The financial burden placed on
the states for maintenance of records and files related to informed
consent is undoubtedly real. There is little financial incentive for
states to expend resources to incorporate additional labor and record-
keeping in newborn screening programs. However, financial incen-
tives should not be the primary consideration when the privacy rights
of newborns and parents are being considered. The state should not
shirk its responsibility to protect its citizens, especially the rights of
newborns, in the name of alleviating costs associated with the collec-
tion of consent and provision of educational materials.173 This is par-
ticularly true given that states are readily engaging in expanded
screening that increases testing costs without evidence to show that
this expansion is cost-effective. There will rarely be financial incentive
to establish programs that require greater record-keeping on the part
of the state to provide meaningful choice to its citizens. However,
there are many rights that cannot and should not be compared to a
financial burden, and privacy rights associated with genetic informa-
tion are definitely among them.174 The role of public policy and the
responsibility of the state in assuring public safety and welfare is an
important one when evaluating the safety of newborns. The state
should play a role in providing testing to parents and ultimately ensur-
ing a healthier population, yet the state should also recognize the role
it plays as secondary to the parent.
B. Model Statutory Guidelines for Newborn Screening Programs
In light of the legal minefield that surrounds newborn screening
programs, it seems the best alternative is to avoid stepping in the
wrong place and diminishing citizens' privacy rights. Newborn screen-
ing programs become minefields when they have no requirement for
informed consent, no requirement for educating parents, and no op-
tion to protect samples from unauthorized research. Great potential
for litigation from parents and infants who feel their privacy rights
have been violated looms, as demonstrated by Beleno and Bearder.
To avoid these mines, newborn screening statutes should require ex-
172. MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 59, at 4.
173. See AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES REPORT, supra note 40, at 8 ("These discrepancies
suggest there is still insufficient information available to support a claim of cost-effectiveness for
increased screening. It must be kept in mind, however, that newborn screening is a public health
activity focused on saving lives, preventing disability, and improving quality of life. Its cost-
effectiveness should not be considered only in terms of financial savings, but also in respect to
reducing infant mortality and maximizing health improvements with limited resources.").
174. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2010) (establishing a statutory requirement for the collection of
informed consent for human research).
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plicit parental consent after parents have the opportunity to engage in
educational discussions with medical professionals. These discussions
should include information regarding (1) the testing of the sample,
including the specific disorders tested for and the knowledge and in-
formation available for treatment of each disorder; (2) the disclosure
of the results and maintenance of confidentiality of the sample itself;
(3) the retention time or optional accelerated destruction of the sam-
ple; and (4) the permissible research uses of the sample.
The role of informed consent should be explicitly stated in the stat-
utory language and unambiguous to the reader, as demonstrated by
the Wyoming statute.175 In addition, the model newborn screening
statute should require documentation of such consent. 176 It is also im-
perative that there be a requirement for parental education; whether
the newborn screening program is opt-in or opt-out, a parent must be
knowledgeable of that to which they are consenting or objecting. The
inclusion of these two provisions, requiring consent and education,
would create a program that begins to recognize and respect the pri-
vacy rights of parents and newborns.
To ensure that the public health and welfare of the community is
also placed in the forefront of consideration, the statute should state
the specific educational materials necessary to ensure each parent is in
fact making an informed and educated decision. Parents should re-
ceive paperwork and be personally told by a medical professional
about the newborn screening program during prenatal visits with full
disclosure of the parents' legal options available under state law.177
The complexity of genetic information may require the states to make
genetic counselors available to parents, as is done with genetic prena-
tal screening, so that parents have the opportunity to fully understand
the ramifications of participating in genetic tests that determine corre-
lations with disease propensity. 78 Finally, the disorders included in
the newborn screening program should be continually reviewed and
175. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-801(c) (2011); see also Drabiak-Syed, supra note 79, at 45
("[1Instituting a consent policy in statutory law and health department procedures would amass a
robust annotated collection while minimizing dignitary harm to newborn participants."); see also
Carnahan, supra note 4, at 329 ("[O]btaining written informed consent from parents exhibits a
respect for parental autonomy in making decisions involving their child's body.").
176. Documentation can be written into the statute by the legislature or mandated by regula-
tions set up by the state's health department.
177. See Elster, supra note 3, at 188 ("With the increased possibilities for future use of re-
tained samples, the time may have come for parents or guardians to be informed at the time of
testing or during the prenatal period of the screening process itself as well as the retention and
potential future uses of any collected samples.").
178. See ACMG/ASHG, supra note 35, at 268 ("The inclusion of additional disorders in the
newborn screening menu could increase the number of patients identified each year by 50% to
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monitored by health professionals and scientists to ensure that only
those disorders with proven benefits of early detection are included.
Each of these points is discussed in further detail below.
1. Role of Parental Consent
In an opt-in program, parents deciding whether to consent to a new-
born screening test retain responsibility and control because only after
their action of consenting will their newborns undergo screening. By
contrast, in a state-mandated program, parents do not retain full re-
sponsibility and control, even if presented with the option to refuse,
because their inaction-or the inaction of the health care provider to
inform the parents of their right to refuse-results in the newborn
being screened. The role of the parent in an opt-in versus an opt-out
program is vastly different, with the opt-out program ultimately plac-
ing the parent in a position inferior to the state and its public policy.
The privacy rights of individual citizens outweigh the costs of imple-
menting procedures to ensure their protection in newborn screening
programs. This is especially true when state governments are consist-
ently implementing procedures for documenting individual records.
For example, states do not obtain financial incentives to record and
maintain birth certificates, yet a second form collected at the same
time frame of life for an infant is allegedly prohibitively burdensome
and costly for some states. So costly in fact that Maryland sacrificed
its consent-based program in favor of a "tree-saving" opt-out pro-
gram. In situations such as this, in which states receive little financial
gain for selecting an opt-in based program, it seems that the states will
only take on the burden of extra steps to ensure individual rights
when the federal government mandates that they do so.
2. Educational Requirements
Regardless of whether a program is opt-out or opt-in, requiring ed-
ucation for parents prior to testing is necessary because parents can-
not effectively consent or decline any procedure when they are not
made fully aware of the procedure itself, as well as its benefits, impli-
cations, and potential drawbacks.179 Most parents do not have the
luxury of operating under a voluntary newborn screening program,
100%, and more physicians, nutritionists, and genetic counselors will be needed to deal with
their ongoing medical and nutritional care.").
179. See Carnahan, supra note 4, at 329 ("Parents deserve straightforward information about
what will happen to their child's DNA sample, how their child's privacy will be protected, and, to
the extent known, the type of research in which the sample will be used, and the conditions
under which samples will be shared.").
902 [Vol. 61:869
NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAMS
but must rely on the disclosure of these programs by medical and
health professionals. The time during which parents are involved in
the beginnings of their newborn's life is potentially full of complex
emotional, physical, and mental exhaustion; therefore, education
should be implemented at a stage earlier than the immediate after-
math of the newborn's birth. 80 Incorporation of newborn screening
program education should occur early in the prenatal process, ensur-
ing that both parents are aware of the program, the panel of diseases
tested, and their options for levels of participation or refusal.
Education must be the cornerstone of any newborn screening pro-
gram because in its absence informed consent cannot exist. To ensure
the proper education is adequately provided, newborn screening pro-
grams should require the parents' documented acknowledgment that
they received information regarding the program and the disorders
screened, that they had the opportunity to discuss this information
with a health professional, and that they had subsequently decided to
permit or refuse blood samples to be collected from their child for
that testing.
3. Panel of Diseases Screened
The standard panel of diseases screened in newborn screening pro-
grams should be limited to only those disorders known to benefit from
diagnosis and treatment at an early stage of life. Therefore, a system
such as the one reviewed by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services seems appropriate-a system that includes evidence-
based research in the evaluation and categorization of diseases into a
tier-based system.181 Nontreatable disorders should be excluded from
the standard tier of diseases screened, especially because the screen-
ing detects the presence of genetic sequences that only correlate to
disease susceptibility. It is difficult to determine what, if any, benefit
exists for including these diseases in the screening panel when no
treatment can be sought and no comfort can be given to the parents
who now have to care for this child, possibly with the knowledge that
the child may be more susceptible to disease later in life. 18 2
It is undeniable that knowledge of prevalence of certain disorders
or risk of certain disorders is beneficial to monitoring public health;
180. See Elster, supra note 3, at 187.
181. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
182. See Clayton, supra note 28, at 200 ("[G]enetic testing cannot now and probably will never
be able to predict with complete certainty the occurrence and course of complex diseases." (foot-
note omitted)). Proposals have been made to ask parents to give informed consent prior to
newborn screening for untreatable disorders and adult onset disorders. Id. at 201.
2012] 903
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
however, a mandatory newborn screening program does not seem the
appropriate place to derive this information, as the use is purely re-
search based and should require informed consent of the newborn pa-
tient providing the sample. 83 Due to the fact that the vast majority of
newborn screening programs in the United States are mandatory, opt-
out programs, a program such as the New England Screening Program
implemented in Massachusetts, 184 seems an appropriate minimum al-
ternative, wherein a mixed-consent program is opt-out for "basic"
testing, but requires consent to participate in the optional expanded
screening.18 5
4. Permissible Research Uses
Once a newborn screening program requires informed consent and
parental education, one of the remaining issues is the potential use of
the blood samples for research. The availability of samples for unlim-
ited research is a risky proposition even if parents provide consent.
Based on the rapid pace of scientific advancement, parents may not
fully appreciate the type of testing or research for which the sample
could ultimately be used. The federal government has taken a stern
approach to the genetic testing of adult research subjects, requiring
informed consent.186 However, despite the fact that many research
uses of newborn screening samples include genetic testing, these pro-
grams are oddly divorced from a requirement of informed consent.1 7
To guarantee the privacy rights of the newborn providing the sam-
ple, parents should be given the option of electing sample retention
for no longer than eighteen years that prohibits research use. Upon
expiration of the permissive sample storage, the state department of
health should be obligated to follow-up with the now-adult sample
donor and obtain permission for research use. Without such permis-
sion given, the blood sample should be destroyed. In addition, the
now eighteen-year-old adult should be able to contact the state to pro-
vide consent or request sample destruction. Although this later con-
sent system would create an eighteen-year research lag in the research
183. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 79, at 45 ("State legislatures and health department policy
should classify this practice as human subjects research, require it to comport with federal regu-
lations, and re-think how to apply federal regulations based on research that undermines our
previous assumptions relating to identifiability.").
184. See NEw ENG. NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM, supra notes 60-62.
185. However, the Massachusetts program does not meet all the advised requirements of this
Comment because it does not mandate parental education in its statutory language. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 110A (2003); see also Therrell et al., supra note 5, at S226-28.
186. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2001); see also Genetic Privacy Act, MINN. STAT. § 13.386 (2011).
187. See Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
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because the sample would be untouched until consent of the eighteen-
year-old donor was received, it would ensure that any research testing
of newborn samples is in fact done with consent of the adult individual
who donated the sample, a protocol more similar to that in place for
adult human research subject testing. This type of consent-based re-
search use of blood samples has been implemented in at least one
state, although not in an ideal manner, as it is coupled with the ability
of the parents to release a sample for research use. South Carolina
(an opt-out state) requires authorization from either the parents or
from the donor of the blood sample upon reaching eighteen years of
age for release of samples for research use.188 In addition, a brochure
notifies South Carolina parents that blood samples are retained only
for testing and explicitly states that research use is not permitted.189
IV. IMPACT
The prevalence of newborn screening programs highlights their im-
portance to the public health of our nation and its citizens. There is
no doubt that states have made thoughtful and educated decisions
about their newborn screening programs and that newborns can bene-
fit by being tested. However, there is clearly room for improvement,
which will only come at the insistence of the parents and citizens who
demand change. Whereas many opt-out states may require education
in newborn screening regulations, a vast majority of opt-out states do
not. It is incumbent upon parents to be proponents for their chil-
dren's health and welfare, and to do this they must have full knowl-
edge of how their child's medical and genetic information is handled.
To effectively change all state newborn screening programs to in-
clude informed consent, require education, limit conditions tested to
those known to benefit the newborn, and inhibit research use without
the newborn's personal consent is a daunting task. The patchwork of
newborn screening programs currently in the United States provides
an opportunity to select what best protects the interests of U.S. citi-
zens and piece together a comprehensive newborn screening pro-
gram-letting the states serve as the experimental grounds of what
works best and fostering those options that best protect the rights of
188. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-37-30(A) to -30(C) (1976 & Supp. 2010).
189. The brochure given to parents in South Carolina regarding newborn screening reads:
"[South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control] will destroy your baby's
blood sample once it is no longer needed for testing. It will not be used in research or for any
purpose other than newborn screening." S.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND ENvrL. CONTROL, NEW-
BORN SCREENING FOR YOUR BABY's HEALTH (2010), available at http://www.scdhec.gov/admin-
istration/library/ML-000032.pdf.
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U.S. citizens. The federal government has attempted to provide uni-
form testing standards linked to funding, yet many states retain poli-
cies that allow refusal only on the basis of religious grounds or not at
all. The concerns of parents recently voiced in Bearder and Beleno
should not go unnoticed.
The gradual adoption of more-tailored newborn screening pro-
grams would alleviate many of the legal and social concerns with
mandatory health programs and would result in parents having op-
tions to elect the testing array that best suits their children's and fam-
ily's needs. These options should include tiered levels of conditions to
test, which would allow parents to select a minimal test that covers
treatable disorders known to have an immediate effect on their new-
born, as opposed to a more comprehensive test that may include new
disorders for which preliminary research data is being collected with
the goal of being able to provide future treatment. This type of dis-
ease categorization lends itself most appropriately to a national uni-
form standard determined by top national expert opinion, medical
knowledge, and peer-reviewed research.190 Many states and regions
have formed their own coalitions, such as the New England Screening
Program, to provide uniformity in their region.191 While these efforts
are clearly beneficial, their reach should be extended to all states, and
they should be funded in large part by the federal government.
For many states, implementation of informed consent procedures
would require new documentation for parents to review and sign to be
kept in the newborn's medical records. The document should, at a
minimum, explain the purpose of the test, the diseases screened, and
the storage and potential research uses of the blood sample. Addi-
tional educational materials explaining the risks and benefits of the
diseases screened and the available treatment options should also be
required to ensure that parents are adequately informed to provide
consent. These procedures, although foreign to the majority of states,
are not impossible to implement, as they have been in place in the
District of Columbia and Wyoming and were in place in Maryland
prior to 2010. Lastly, the storage of the blood sample and any options
available to parents for accelerated disposal or for later release of the
sample for research use would need to be communicated to the par-
190. But see AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES REPORT, supra note 40, at 8 (noting that, while a
uniform newborn screening program would minimize variation between the state programs,
there are barriers against implementing a uniform screening program, such as "issues relating to
cost, scarcity of resources, and a lack of evidence confirming the clinical benefits and cost-
effectiveness of current screening programs").
191. See NEW ENG. NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM, supra note 49.
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ents. States vary widely in their options for sample storage and later
use, but of the existing options, the example of South Carolina best
protects the privacy rights of parents and children, requiring their per-
mission for any research use, including from the donor child.
V. CONCLUSION
The importance of the privacy rights of newborn and adult citizens
mandates a serious reevaluation of where the newborn screening pro-
grams stand in the hierarchy of individual decision and choice. Ne-
braska's mandatory program, which offers no option of refusal, is
unreasonable and cannot be justified in view of the high protections
afforded individual genetic information and the constitutionally guar-
anteed privacy interests of every U.S. citizen. Programs allowing citi-
zens to opt out for religious reasons, while sufficiently recognizing the
constitutional right to practice religion, are still inadequate because
they do not allow those individuals who may have scientific, non-
religious reasons for declining genetic testing. Opt-out programs that
allow parental refusal for any reason must also require education
about the screening and provide educational materials; otherwise the
option of refusal is useless. Only consent-based programs place a suf-
ficient burden on the state to provide the education necessary to fully
protect parental and infant privacy rights while ensuring the public
health and welfare of our newborn citizens.
The impact of legal change in a democracy is entirely dependent on
the desire of the populace to make that change. Until the parents and
citizens of each state raise their voices to share the importance of their
individual choice in genetic testing for themselves and for their chil-
dren, the current landscape of newborn screening programs will not
change. Health professionals and legislatures of many states have
been extremely thoughtful and active in promoting the beneficial
medical service that newborn screening programs provide. However,
this promotion has not equally emphasized the importance of parental
education and choice in the process. Medical providers will prioritize,
as they should, the health of their patients and actively engage in any-
thing they can do to ensure a healthier start for a newborn child. Par-
ents should do the same thing, but parents should also be able to play
an active role in making a choice that recognizes the limits of the use-
fulness of medical information for themselves and their infants. Bal-
ancing both of these priorities is an achievable goal that requires a
newborn screening program that (1) is consent-based, honoring paren-
tal and infant privacy rights; (2) is education-focused, ensuring parents
are as informed as medical professionals as to the valuable insight the
2012] 907
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
testing will provide; (3) is limited in scope to disorders that are truly
benefited by early detection, ensuring that additional untreatable dis-
orders that can be detected only at a later date are not "tacked-on";
and (4) permits research expansion if the infant so desires her sample
to be used in such a manner.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
On November 16, 2011, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bearder v.
State held that the Genetic Privacy Act applies to blood samples col-
lected by the Department of Health for its newborn screening pro-
gram, reversing the court of appeals. 192 The court reasoned that
because the blood samples fall within the definition of "biological in-
formation collected from an individual" of the Genetic Privacy Act' 93
they are subject to the requirements of being collected, used, stored,
and disseminated only with the individual's written informed con-
sent.194 The court then turned its analysis to the newborn screening
statutes to determine whether these statutes served as express authori-
zation and therefore exceptions to the requirements of written in-
formed consent in the Genetic Privacy Act.195
The court concluded that the newborn screening statutes do provide
an express exception to the Genetic Privacy Act, but only to the ex-
tent that the Department is authorized to test the samples for herita-
ble and congenital disorders, record and report the test results,
maintain a registry of positive cases for follow-up services, and storing
those test results as required by federal law.196 The court determined
that the newborn screening statutes did "not expressly provide for in-
definite storage when no destruction request is received,"197 and that
"no other source of law authoriz[ed] the dissemination of blood sam-
ples or genetic information beyond that expressly authorized for the
reporting of newborn test results." 198 The court therefore concluded
that the newborn screening statutes do not expressly authorize the
192. 806 N.W.2d 766, 774 (Minn. 2011). The dissenting justices found that the majority's con-
clusion necessitated the identical term in the Genetic Privacy Act to have two different meanings
in the same subdivision of the same statute and, as such, was improper statutory interpretation.
See id. at 777-85. One dissenting justice noted that the majority reached the correct policy re-
sult, but that "my role as a judge is not to implement my own policy preferences, but to interpret
the law as written." Id. at 784-85.
193. MINN. STAT. §13.386, subd. 1(b) (2011).
194. Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 771.
195. Id. at 773-74
196. Id.
197. Id. at 776.
198. Id.
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Department to engage in any use, storage, or dissemination other than
those expressly stated without obtaining informed consent.199
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision had a direct effect on
Minnesota's newborn screening. A routine destruction of all residual
blood spots received on or after the date of the supreme court deci-
sion began on January 30, 2012, and a litigation hold was placed on all
data and specimens from babies born between July 1997 and Novem-
ber 15, 2011 (unless the parents requested destruction). 200
The effect of the supreme court's decision in Bearder v. State on the
pending Minnesota legislation remains to be seen.201 However, the
decision's explicit finding that the newborn screening statute is ex-
empt from the Genetic Privacy Act, to the extent it authorizes collec-
tion, use, storage, and dissemination of samples, may invite Minnesota
(or other states) to simply broaden the scope of the statutory authori-
zation for its state health department and ensure it explicitly captures
further use, storage, and dissemination beyond the disorders tested in
the screening program itself. The Bearder decision, while supporting
the requirement of informed consent for uses of samples beyond the
statutory purposes of newborn screening does little to encourage the
requirement of informed consent for initial collection and testing of
the blood sample. However, the Minnesota decision may serve as a
first dent to the established newborn screening programs' machinery
and encourage other state health departments to place similar restric-
tions on any research uses, storage, or dissemination outside of any
already explicitly contained in their respective newborn screening
statutes.
Rachel L. Schweers, Ph.D.*
199. Id. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of remedy as the facts
alleged were insufficient to support whether the appellants' children's blood samples had been
used, stored, or disseminated in violation of the Genetic Privacy Act. Id. at 777.
200. Latest Newborn Screening Program Alert, MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, http://www.health.
state.mn.us/newbornscreening.
201. See H.F. 1341, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009); S.F. 1478, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn.
2009).
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